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Amendments May Relate Back
To Validate Service of Process
Leniston v. Bonfiglio' is worthy of inspection not only because of the
proposition for which the case stands but also because of the manner in
which the Georgia Court of Appeals chose to convey this proposition to the
reader. Mrs. Alice Bonfiglio filed her complaint in the State Court of
DeKalb County for $200 in damages to her automobile, allegedly precipitated by the negligence of defendant, Mrs. Leniston. Service of process was
effectuated by a deputy marshal's tacking the summons to the door' of
Mrs. Leniston's most notorious place of abode in DeKalb County, pursuant
to C.P.A. § 4(d)(6).1 Contending that she had been improperly served,
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction,
since C.P.A. § 4(d)(6) authorizes leaving a copy of the summons at defendant's most notorious place of abode only in cases where the principal sum
is less than $200. The trial court allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint
by reducing the amount of relief demanded from $200 to $150, thereby
bringing it within the confines of the statute. In light of the amendment
to the complaint, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied and the case
was tried before the court sitting without a jury. The court found for the
plaintiff in the amount of $131.06.
Defendant appealed from this judgment and asserted as error improper
service of process, notwithstanding the amendment permitted by the trial
court. She contended "that since the [original] complaint was for $200,
service of process could be perfected only by serving 'the defendant personally, or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house . . . with some
person of suitable age' under C.P.A. § 4(d)(7)."' The fatal defect of plaintiff's complaint, argued defendant, was that C.P.A. § 4(d)(6) could not
control since the amount asked in damages was not less than $200 and
"plaintiff's amendment changing the amount claimed cannot relate back
1. 138 Ga. App. 151, 226 S.E.2d 1 (1976).
2. The phrase "tacking it on the door" is used throughout Leniston and similar cases to
describe the manner of service of process authorized by C.P.A. § 4(d)(6), that of simply
leaving a copy of the summons at defendant's most notorious place of abode in cases involving
less than $200. In regard to the likelihood of actual notice to the person being served, this is
clearly an inferior means of service when compared with C.P.A. § 4(d)(7), which stipulates
that service "in all other cases" must be perfected to defendant personally or left at his "usual
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion" if the factual situation
involved does not fall within special provisions for service of process in C.P.A. §§ 4(d)(1)
through 4(d)(6).
3. GA. CoDE ANN. § 81A-104(d)(6) (1972). The 1966 Civil Practice Act, 1966 Ga. Laws 609691, is codified at GA. CODE ANN. ch. 81A-1 (1972), the sections of which match the section
numbers of the Act. Future references in this note will be to the Act only.
4. 138 Ga. App. at 151, 226 S.E.2d at 1 (emphasis in original).
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to validate the service of process." '
The issue before the court was whether the amendment allowing a requested reduction in damages from $200 to $150 in order to bring the
complaint within C.P.A. § 4(d)(6) could relate back to validate service of
process by tacking. The court held in the affirmative and supported its
conclusion by simply enumerating some Georgia appellate court cases
which have interpreted the provisions of C.P.A. § 15 to provide for a liberal
use of amendments and a liberal application of the doctrine of relation
back.
To illustrate the liberal use of amendments,' the court cited three cases
in which amendments were used for various purposes in the course of trial.
In Rigby v. Powell7 the appellant moved to strike the appellees' answers
on the ground that the answers were not verified. The court sustained the
appellant's motion to strike the answers subject to the appellees' filing an
amendment to verify their answers. The Georgia Supreme Court cited
C.P.A. § 15(a) and held that failure to verify, if required, may be corrected
by amendment and thus the trial court did not err in allowing such an
amendment.
Similarly, McDonald v. Rogers" held that a party may, by amendment,
plead a new cause of action: "The right to amend pleadings under the Civil
Practice Act is very broad and there is no prohibition against the pleading
of a new cause of action by amendment."'
The liberal use of amendments was further exemplified in the context
of an interesting factual setting in City of Atlanta v. Fuller.10 Mrs. Fuller
sued the City of Atlanta and the driver of a city water department truck
for injuries allegedly sustained when the truck collided with an automobile
in which she was a passenger. Thereafter the plaintiff set up the ante litem
notice to the municipality by amendment. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on insufficiency of notice was overruled.
On appeal, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether notice to
the municipality regarding the nature of the injury required by Georgia
Code § 69-308, when not set out in the original petition, could be added
by amendment. This question was answered in the affirmative. With the
5. Id. at 152, 226 S.E.2d at 1.
6. That amendments to pleading are favored is well-settled. C.P.A. § 15(a) states: "A
party may amend his pleading as a matter of course and without leave of court at any time
before the entry of a pre-trial order. Thereafter the party may amend his pleadings only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." (emphasis added).
7. 233 Ga. 158, 210 S.E.2d 696 (1974).
8. 229 Ga. 369, 191 S.E.2d 844 (1972).
9. Id. at 378, 191 S.E.2d at 852. It is entirely irrelevant that a proposed amendment
changes the cause of action or theory of the case or that it states a claim arising out of a
transaction different from that originally sued on. Longbottom v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th
Cir. 1968).
10. 118 Ga. App. 563, 164 S.E.2d 364 (1968).
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rationale for its decision grounded in C.P.A. § 15," the court was fully
justified in holding that "[wihatever may have been the former rule . . .
there is now no procedural inhibition against allowing the ante litem
notice to be added by amendment."' 2
Liberal construction of the relation-back provision of C.P.A. § 15(c)' 3 is
also essential to the Leniston holding, since the service of process could not
be validated by subsequent amendment if the amendment were not permitted to relate back to that point in time when the deputy tacked the
summons on the door of Mrs. Leniston's dwelling.
It is well established by such cases as Gordon v. Gillespie" that amendments may relate back to add parties after the statute of limitation has
run." Gordon brought a complaint against Gillespie seeking recovery of
damages for the death of his father, alleging negligence on the part of
defendant. The oversights of plaintiff's original attorney resulted in
plaintiff's eventually changing counsel in the middle of the lawsuit and
resorting to an affidavit attached to the amendment regarding several
aspects of the case. Such oversights also resulted in the tolling of the
statute of limitation on plaintiff's proposed suit before his brothers could
be added as parties to the wrongful death action.
The trial court judge sustained, inter alia, defendant's objection to
plaintiff's motion to amend based on the fact that the complaint on its face
showed that any claim for relief by the additional parties sought to be
added to the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitation. The plaintiff
appealed from this judgment.
In reviewing the effect of the relation-back doctrine of C.P.A. § 15(c),
the court of appeals noted that relation back is applicable to amendments
by plaintiffs as well as defendants, although the wording of the statute
11. As in Leniston, the relation-back provision of C.P.A. § 15(c) was material to the
decision in City of Atlanta v. Fuller. Clearly, if the amendment had not related back to the
original complaint, notice to the city would have been imperfect.
12. 118 Ga. App. at 564, 164 S.E.2d at 365.
13. C.P.A. § 15(c) provides in pertinent part: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading."
14. 135 Ga. App. 369, 217 S.E.2d 628 (1975).
15. See note 9, supra. It seems appropriate to recognize at this juncture that refusal to
permit amendment is an abuse of discretion in the absence of some justification for such
refusal: "If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In
the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require, be
'freely given.' " Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
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could be interpreted otherwise." The court also examined" the underlying
rationale behind the doctrine of relation back of amendments:
The Federal Rules have broadened the meaning of "cause of action,"
shifting the.emphasis from a theory of law as to the cause of action, to
the specified conduct of the defendant upon which the plaintiff relies to
enforce his claim. And an amendment which changes only the legal theory
of the action, or adds another claim arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence, will relate back."
Consequently, the court held that "there is nothing in the language of
Section 15 of the Civil Practice Act which requires that in order to add
parties whose claims relate back to the filing of the original complaint, the
added parties must be necessary parties.""
In Sam Findley, Inc. v. Interstate Fire Insurance Co.,20 the court of
appeals construed the relation-back provision of C.P.A. § 15(c) to allow the
complainant to bring an entirely new cause of action after the statute of
limitation had run. The court recognized the utility and rationale buttressing C.P.A. § 15(c):
[Federal] Rule 15(c) is based on the idea that a party who is notified
of litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence is entitled to no
more protection from statutes of limitation than one who is informed of
the precise legal description of the rights sought to be enforced. If the
original pleading gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which
the claim arises, the defendant will not be deprived of any protection
which the state statute of limitations was designed to afford him. Being
able to take2advantage of plaintiff's pleading mistakes is not one of these
protections. '
The court in Leniston offered an additional basis of support for its holding in the following excerpt: "'Courts have allowed amendments to relate
back in order to permit valid service of process, in certain other instances.'
See, 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15(6), p. 1071, and cases cited
therein. ' 22 The court also noted that jurisdictional amendments were per16. 135 Ga. App. at 374-75, 217 S.E.2d at 633.
17. "The application of this rule [FED. R. Civ. P.1 15(c) by the federal courts may be of
assistance in the present case." Id. at 374, 217 S.E.2d at 633. The reason for this emphasis
on interpretation of FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) is that C.P.A. § 15(c) is now an exact duplicate of
the federal rule. With this fact in mind, the opinion subsequently cited three federal court
cases in support of the holding in Gordon v. Gillespie.
18. 135 Ga. App. at 375, 217 S.E.2d at 633, quoting from 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
15.15131, at 1027-29 (1974).
19. Id. at 374, 217 S.E.2d at 632.
20. 135 Ga. App. 14, 217 S.E.2d 358 (1975).
21. Id. at 18, 217 S.E.2d at 361, quoting from 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 15.1512],
at 1021-23 (1974).
22. 138 Ga. App. at 152, 226 S.E.2d at 2.
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mitted prior to the enactment of the Civil Practice Act. In these older
cases,213 amendments were allowed where the amount originally claimed
was in excess of the jurisdiction of the justice court in which plaintiffs
brought their claims.
The decision in Leniston v. Bonfiglio concluded with this formulation of
the court's holding: "Under these authorities we see no reason why an
amendment should not relate back to the original complaint thereby vali5
dating service of process." 24 Implicit in this holding is a court footnote
which contains a cryptic comment that tacking as a valid means of service
of process may have constitutional deficiencies. If the potential impact of
Leniston upon civil procedure in Georgia is to be fully appreciated, this
constitutional question must be addressed.
In Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp.,2 service of process by leaving
a copy of the summons at defendant's most notorious abode in the county,
pursuant to Code § 81-202,1 was attacked as "not reasonably calculated
to apprise [appellant] of the pendency of the action and afford him an
opportunity to present his defense to the action and was a denial of due
process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. ' 2 The Georgia Supreme Court applied the
Mullane v. CentralHanoverBank & Trust Co. 29 standard of notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
to the provisions of Code § 81-202 and found those provisions constitutionally inadequate. The court held: "The mere leaving of copy of suit at the
residence of the defendant is not reasonably calculated to apprise him of
the pendency of an action against him." Therefore, the code section was
concluded to be in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apartments, 31the supreme court held
23. Johnson v. Johnson, 113 Ga. 942, 39 S.E. 311 (1901) (summons may be amended to
show that amount actually due on note was within jurisdictional limits), and MacDonald v.
Ware & Harper, 17 Ga. App. 450, 87 S.E. 679 (1916) (where amount apparently claimed is in
excess of jurisdiction of justice court, the defect may be obviated by amendment of the
summons).
24. 138 Ga. App. at 153, 226 S.E.2d at 2.
25. Id. at 152, n.1, 226 S.E.2d at 1 n.1.
26. 231 Ga. 569, 203 S.E.2d 204 (1974).
27. Repealed by 1966 Ga. Laws 609, 687. Itisimportant to note that the formulation of
GA. CODE ANN. § 81-202 issimilar to that of C.P.A. § 4(d)(6) except that there isno $200
limit on the principal sum involved in the lawsuit.
28. 231 Ga. at 569, 203 S.E.2d at 205.
29. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
30. 231 Ga. at 571, 203 S.E.2d at 206. In so holding, the court noted the following possibilities that could result in allowing service of process by merely leaving a copy of suit at the
residence of the defendant: "He may be absent from such residence for an extended length
of time. He may be in the process of moving from one residence to another. The copy may be
destroyed by inclement weather, or be removed by other persons."
31. 233 Ga. 208, 210 S.E.2d 722 (1974).
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that service of process by tacking as provided for in Code § 61-302 was
constitutional in the context of a landlord's dispossessory action. The distinction between a quasi-in-rem action, such as the dispossessory action,
and an in-personam action, as in Womble, was the foundation for the
decision in Pelletier."2 Based on this quasi-in-rem-in-personam distinction, the court held that tacking is reasonably calculated to apprise the
interested parties of the pendency of the action within the narrow limits
of a landlord's dispossessory warrant.33
In contrasting these two cases, a general rule emerges in which tacking
is a constitutionally permissible form of service of process in quasi-in-rem
actions, but is fatally deficient in in-personam actions. Leniston is a classic
in-personam action: Two individuals appeared in court to contest alleged
negligence that proximately resulted in damage to personal property. However, appellant did not raise this constitutional issue at trial or on appeal.
The probable reason for such an omission is the case of Bryant v. PriorTire
Co." in which the Georgia Supreme Court declined to invalidate service
of process by tacking because the appellant did not demonstrate that she
had been injured (i.e., that she had not received actual notice) by the
purported unconstitutional tacking provision of C.P.A. § 4(d)(6).15 It appears that Mrs. Leniston did, in fact, receive actual notice and, therefore,
did not have a valid constitutional objection.
Taken together, these three cases lend credence to Justice Gunter's special concurrence in Bryant:
However, I am of the opinion that Subsection 6 of subparagraph (d) of
this statute [C.P.A. § 41 is violative of equal protection under both the
Georgia and Federal Constitutions; and in a proper case it should be
declared unconstitutional. I can see no rational basis for making a distinction in the manner of service of summons in actions involving less than
two hundred ($200) dollars and those involving two hundred ($200) or
more. In other words, I would hold that "in all other cases" involving any
32. Such a characterization was necessary to adequately distinguish Womble: "The tenant's argument that tacking is unconstitutional fails to take cognizance of the historical and
practical differences between a dispossessory action-a descendant of the old ejectment action and arguably a quasi-in-rem proceeding-and in personam actions, decisions on which
he urges are controlling here, most notably Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp ....
a suit
brought upon a note." Id. at 210, 210 S.E.2d at 724.
As directed by the court's footnote, Id., n.2, see Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
29, 36-37 (1948); Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV.
909, 949 (1960); Note, The Requirements of Seizure in the Exercise of Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction,63 HARV. L. REV. 657, 667 (1950).
33. 233 Ga. at 213, 210 S.E.2d at 725.
34. 230 Ga. 137, 196 S.E.2d 14 (1973).
35. The court stated that the appellant "must show that the alleged unconstitutional
feature of the statute injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights protected by
the Constitution of this State or by the Constitution of the United States, or by both." Id. at
138, 196 S.E.2d at 15.
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stated amount, service must be perfected in accordance with Subsection
7 of subparagraph (d) of this statute.3A
This cogent argument was considered compelling in Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp. The subsequent case of Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden
Apartments distinguished Womble, but only to the extent necessary to
allow tacking as service of process within the narrow dispossessory warrant
limits. These two cases supply the foundation for upholding tacking only
in the limited context of quasi-in-rem actions, while invalidating its use
in all in-personam actions. It is suspected that, given the appropriate case
and Justice Gunter's persuasive concurring opinion, C.P.A. § 4(d)(6)
would be struck down as unconstitutional in any in-personam action, regardless of the monetary amount involved. Unfortunately, Leniston v.
Bonfiglio did not constitute such an appropriate case, since Mrs. Leniston
had not been denied actual notice as a result of the utilization of tacking
as service of process.
While it would appear that the court in Leniston has arrived at a procedurally logical conclusion regarding relation back of amendments to validate service of process, 37 the opinion is less than intellectually satisfying.
Indeed, the case is totally devoid of incisive judicial analysis. Regardless
of the method employed by the court in arriving at its decision, however,
it is clear that Leniston v. Bonfiglio represents further liberalization of the
Civil Practice Act and continued emphasis upon notice pleading, even
when such notice must be judicially validated after the fact by the legal
fiction of relation back. The questions raised by Leniston with regard to
the suspect constitutionality of the tacking provision of C.P.A. § 4(d)(6)
must wait for an appropriate case to reach the appellate courts of Georgia
before answers are provided.
MICHAEL

G.

GRAY

36. Id. at 140, 196 S.E.2d at 15-16. For an excellent treatment of the cases cited by the
courts regarding service of process by tacking and a discussion of the constitutional ramifications that are involved, see Beard and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial
Practiceand Procedure, 27 MER. L. REV. 235, 244-45 (1975).
37. This fact is especially true in light of the emphasis placed on notice of pending
proceedings which is the focus of both the Civil Practice Act and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In this regard, see Sam Finley, Inc. v. Interstate Fire Insurance Co., 135 Ga. App.
14, 217 S.E.2d 358 (1975).

